In Freud's texts. Entry · Long entry · All entries · Ask the research tool
In the passages read, Freud's term carries four senses:
The main dated line runs from the «Erinnerungssymbol» of 1894 [GW I:63], through the compromise formula of 1908 [GW VII:196], to the 1926 restatement «Das Symptom sei Anzeichen und Ersatz einer unterbliebenen Triebbefriedigung, ein Erfolg des Verdrängungsvorganges.» [GW XIV:118].
The distinction a reader must not miss is what the symptom substitutes for, because the object changes: - In 1894 it substitutes for an idea: «einen Ersatz oder ein Surrogat der unverträglichen sexuellen Vorstellung» [GW I:67]. - In one 1917 lecture it substitutes for a becoming-conscious that failed to happen: «Die Symptombildung ist ein Ersatz für etwas anderes, was unterblieben ist.» [GW XI:289]. - In 1917 and 1926 it substitutes for a denied satisfaction [GW XI:379; GW XIV:118]. - The compound «Ersatzbefriedigungen» first appears in the pages read in 1926 [GW XIV:142].
A second point not to miss concerns inhibition. In 1926 Freud first grants that in ordinary usage «Es kann also auch eine Hemmung ein Symptom sein.» [GW XIV:113]. He then distinguishes inhibition from symptom by locus: «Das Symptom kann nicht mehr als ein Vorgang im oder am Ich beschrieben werden.» [GW XIV:117]. What he contrasts is inhibition and symptom; he does not say that he is contrasting two senses of the word. Reading this as a descriptive sense set against a systematic sense of "Symptom" is this entry's own labelling [ii].
In the passages read, Freud's "Symptom" carries four senses, because the texts give four different definitions: a clinical sign of a morbid process, a product of defence standing as a memory symbol of traumatic experience, a substitute for a repressed aim at satisfaction formed in conflict and called a compromise, and a formation that carries an unconscious sense. Two further splits are possible but are not counted. Wish fulfilment and sexual substitute stay within Sense 3 because in 1908 Freud declares the formulas stating them free of contradiction, and because one 1917 sentence joins the libidinal and wish-fulfilling sides, though no 1917 page read declares them compatible. The entry also decides not to count the 1926 placing of the symptom outside the ego organisation, with the secondary struggle against it and its incorporation into the ego, as a fifth sense; this is the entry's own decision, and a reader could count it. The main dated line runs as follows:
The pages of the Traumdeutung (labelled 1900) and the Drei Abhandlungen (labelled 1905) that also carry Sense 3 show later layers, so 1908 is its earliest date not undermined by layering.
Sense 1 is taken over from usage and kept as usage up to 1926. In that year Freud demotes it as theory, saying the question starting from it proves of little fruit, while the same pages still speak of the work inhibition as an isolated symptom. The pages read show no explicit abandonment of Sense 2. It last appears as a definition in 1908, where its formulas are declared compatible with the compromise formula but ranked beneath it. On the entry's reading, this ranking places compromise within the essay's frame of the symptom as the realisation of an unconscious phantasy. In 1917 Freud expects that the traumatic viewpoint will not have to be given up as erroneous but will have to be fitted in and subordinated elsewhere; that viewpoint concerns neurosis rather than the symptom, and the pages read do not carry out the subordination. Sense 3 is kept as the core in 1926. Freud leaves open only whether all primary hysterical symptoms are built as a compromise between the need for satisfaction and the need for punishment, a structure in which the super-ego is involved, so this is not an open question about compromise between drive and repression as such. Whether Sense 4 is kept the pages read do not say: the 1926 pages read do not use "Sinn", and one passage speaks of a symptom receiving the "Bedeutung" of a satisfaction.
On attribution: - Freud proposes the name "Konversion" in a position he shares with Breuer. - The memory-symbol thesis is attributed to Breuer in 1896, while the co-causation by earlier memories is Freud's own hedged thesis. - Clinical psychiatry is said to treat obsessional symptoms as signs of degeneration, which Freud rejects as a value judgement instead of an explanation. - The sexual formulation of Sense 3 is given as Freud's own earlier wording with no other source named, which does not show that it originated with him. - Sadger is reported to argue for the general validity of the bisexual formula that Freud restricts. - "Introversion" is taken from Jung, with a meaning Freud fixes himself. - The sense of symptoms is credited first to Breuer, with Janet credited for an independent demonstration and literary priority and Leuret for an earlier opinion; Freud calls this priority question fairly indifferent. - The thesis that this sense must stay unconscious for the symptom to arise is also presented as Breuer's discovery, which Freud asserts with him.
On the entry's reading, Sense 1 is the ordinary ground from which the others depart, and the where-from and what-for of Sense 4 line up with Senses 2 and 3. The claim that Freud meant Sense 4 as that synthesis remains a conjecture, and so does the claim that the 1926 conversion symptoms recall the memory symbol. Reading "unbewußt" in Sense 4 as "unknown to the patient", in a descriptive use, is the entry's interpretation, and a passage at GW XI:287 pulls against it. Freud's statement that the symptom itself is conscious is made there for obsessional symptoms only. The entry holds several tensions as HOLD TENSION:
It holds one tension as RECONNECT, concerning becoming conscious and being told. It treats the 1926 negative obsessional symptoms as RECONNECT in part, through fusion with satisfaction where that succeeds and through a masochistic meaning for the self-punishing series, and as HOLD TENSION for the remaining prohibitions and precautions.
The distinction a reader must not miss is what the symptom substitutes for, because this changes: - an incompatible idea in 1894; - the associative return of traumatic experiences in 1908; - a becoming-conscious that failed to happen in Vorlesung XVIII of 1917; - a denied satisfaction in Vorlesung XXIII of 1917 and in 1926, with "Ersatzbefriedigungen" appearing in the pages read only in 1926.
A reader should also not confuse three further pairs: - The symptom's wish fulfilment is not the perceptual definition of wish fulfilment; the pages read do not show the symptom fulfilling a wish in that sense. - The symptom's unconscious sense is not its manifest senselessness. - The symptom is not inhibition. In 1926 Freud grants that an inhibition can be a symptom in usage, then sets the two apart because the symptom can no longer be described as a process in or at the ego. Calling this a descriptive sense against a systematic sense is the entry's labelling, not Freud's.
Senses. 1. Clinical sign (1894 to 1926): a manifest sign of a morbid process, taken over from ordinary usage, stated in Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen (1894), Zur Ätiologie der Hysterie (1896), Vorlesung XVII (1917), the opening of Vorlesung XXIII (1917, on the entry's reading) and Hemmung, Symptom und Angst (1926). 2. Product of defence and memory symbol (1894 to 1908): what the ego's defence produces, standing as a memory symbol of traumatic experience, in Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen (1894), Studien über Hysterie (1895), Zur Ätiologie der Hysterie (1896) and Hysterische Phantasien und ihre Beziehung zur Bisexualität (1908). 3. Substitute satisfaction and compromise formed in conflict (1908 to 1926; earlier attestations in the Traumdeutung, labelled 1900, and the Drei Abhandlungen, labelled 1905, are layered): an altered expression of a repressed aim at satisfaction, in most passages together with the force that opposes it, in Hysterische Phantasien (1908), Vorlesung XXIII (1917) and Hemmung, Symptom und Angst (1926). 4. Bearer of an unconscious sense (1917): a formation whose sense, made up of its where-from and its what-for, must be unconscious for the symptom to arise, in Vorlesungen XVII and XVIII (1917).
Where to read. - GW I:57-74 (Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen, 1894) - GW I:294-306 (Studien über Hysterie, Zur Psychotherapie der Hysterie, part, 1895) - GW I:425-436 (Zur Ätiologie der Hysterie, opening, 1896) - GW VII:191-199 (Hysterische Phantasien und ihre Beziehung zur Bisexualität, 1908) - GW XI:264-295 and 372-391 (Vorlesungen XVII, XVIII and XXIII, 1917) - GW XIV:113-129 and 140-147 (Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, ch. I-III and V-VI, part, 1926)
The layered Sense 3 pages are GW II/III:568-578 (Die Traumdeutung VII.C, part, labelled 1900) and GW V:63-67 (Drei Abhandlungen I.4, part, labelled 1905).
The entry is drawn from the long entry below, which gives each sense with Freud's words, dates and pages.
The texts give four senses, because they give four different definitions, each with its own place in the theory and its own dates of appearance. Two further splits are possible but are not counted:
In Freud's words. - «Symptom hingegen heißt soviel wie Anzeichen eines krankhaften Vorganges.» [GW XIV:113] (A symptom, by contrast, means roughly a sign of a morbid process.) - «für deren Grundsymptome ein psychischer Mechanismus gar nicht anzunehmen ist.» [GW I:72] (for whose basic symptoms no psychical mechanism at all is to be assumed.)
What it means. In this sense "symptom" names a manifest sign of illness and makes no claim about how the sign arises. The 1926 text spells out ordinary usage: one speaks «von Symptom, wo es sich um eine ungewöhnliche Abänderung derselben oder um eine neue Leistung handelt» [GW XIV:113] (of a symptom where a function is unusually altered or a new performance appears). In 1894 the same word covers neurasthenic symptoms that have no psychical mechanism at all, so the word by itself does not carry the defence theory [ii].
When and where. The sense is present from the start, in the 1894 «Symptomkomplex der Hysterie» [GW I:60] and in the neurasthenic «Grundsymptome» [GW I:72]. It appears in the 1896 opening, about the harmful influences to which patients themselves trace «jenen neurotischen Symptomen» [GW I:425]. In 1917 a lecture opens with a descriptive characterisation, limited to psychical symptoms: «Die Symptome [...] sind für das Gesamtleben schädliche oder wenigstens nutzlose Akte, häufig von der Person als widerwillig beklagt und mit Unlust oder Leiden für sie verbunden.» [GW XI:372] (The symptoms are acts harmful or at least useless for life as a whole, often complained of by the person as unwanted and bound up with unpleasure or suffering.) Placing this characterisation under Sense 1 is this entry's reading [ii], since it describes symptoms by their manifest effect and not by their formation. The same page gives the layperson's view, «Für den Laien sind es die Symptome, die das Wesen der Krankheit bilden, und Heilung ist ihm die Aufhebung der Symptome.» [GW XI:372] (For the layperson the symptoms make up the essence of the illness, and cure means removing them.) The sense also appears in the diagnostic use of typical symptoms: «Vergessen wir nicht, es sind ja diese typischen Symptome, nach denen wir uns für die Stellung der Diagnose orientieren.» [GW XI:279]. In 1926 the sense becomes an explicit object of analysis [GW XIV:113].
Freud's own or taken over. The sense is taken over from usage: «Der Sprachgebrauch verfährt dann so» [GW XIV:113]. Clinical psychiatry is said to treat obsessional symptoms as signs: «daß sie sie für die Anzeichen einer besonderen Degenerationsweise ausgibt» [GW XI:287] (that it passes them off as signs of a particular kind of degeneration). In the preceding lecture psychiatry is said to call the bearers of such symptoms degenerate: «Dafür betont sie, daß die Träger solcher Symptome „Degenerierte" sind.» [GW XI:268]. Freud rejects this: «Das ist wenig Befriedigung, eigentlich ein Werturteil, eine Verurteilung anstatt einer Erklärung.» [GW XI:268] (That is little satisfaction; it is really a value judgement, a condemnation instead of an explanation.)
Abandoned or kept. Freud keeps the sense as usage but demotes it as theory: «Das alles ist wirklich nicht interessant und die Fragestellung, von der wir ausgingen, erweist sich als wenig fruchtbar.» [GW XIV:113]. The same pages still speak of «Die Arbeitshemmung, die so oft als isoliertes Symptom Gegenstand der Behandlung wird» [GW XIV:115].
Not to be confused with. It should not be confused with what this entry calls the 1926 systematic sense (Sense 3), where «Das Symptom kann nicht mehr als ein Vorgang im oder am Ich beschrieben werden.» [GW XIV:117] (The symptom can no longer be described as a process in or at the ego.) In Sense 1 an inhibition can be a symptom. At GW XIV:117 the two are defined apart. The statements are therefore compatible only if the senses are kept separate [ii].
In Freud's words. - «Das Ich hat damit erreicht, daß es widerspruchsfrei geworden ist, es hat sich aber dafür mit einem Erinnerungssymbol belastet» [GW I:63] (The ego has thereby become free of contradiction, but it has burdened itself in exchange with a memory symbol.) - «Es führt aber in der Wirklichkeit eine ununterbrochene Reihe von den unveränderten Erinnerungsresten affektvoller Erlebnisse und Denkakte bis zu den hysterischen Symptomen, ihren Erinnerungssymbolen.» [GW I:302] (In reality an unbroken series leads from the unchanged memory residues of affect-laden experiences and acts of thought to the hysterical symptoms, their memory symbols.) - «daß kein hysterisches Symptom aus einem realen Erlebnis allein hervorgehen kann, sondern daß alle Male die assoziativ geweckte Erinnerung an frühere Erlebnisse zur Verursachung des Symptoms mitwirkt» [GW I:432] (that no hysterical symptom can arise from a real experience alone, but that the associatively awakened memory of earlier experiences always takes part in causing it.)
What it means. In 1894 the ego cannot erase an incompatible idea. It weakens the idea instead, by detaching its quantity of excitation, and «die von ihr abgetrennte Erregungssumme muß aber einer andern Verwendung zugeführt werden.» [GW I:63] (the detached quantity of excitation must be put to another use). Where that quantity goes decides the form of the symptom: - In hysteria the quantity goes into the body: «wofür ich den Namen der Konversion vorschlagen möchte» [GW I:63] (for which I would propose the name conversion). - In obsessions the freed affect attaches to other ideas, which «durch diese "falsche Verknüpfung" zu Zwangsvorstellungen werden.» [GW I:66] (become obsessional ideas through this "false connection").
The text does not say outright that the 1894 memory symbol is the symptom. That identification rests on the sentence just before, which announces the path to «des neurotischen Symptoms» [GW I:63] [ii].
In 1895 the symptom is overdetermined, «wie häufig ein Symptom mehrfach determiniert, überbestimmt ist» [GW I:294], and vomiting stands «an Stelle einer psychischen Aktion (hier des Aussprechens)» [GW I:302] (in place of a psychical action, here the speaking out).
In 1896 the symptom is a sign that can be read back to its causes. To explain it, a scene must have both «die betreffende determinierende Eignung» and «die nötige traumatische Kraft» [GW I:428] (the fitting determining suitability and the necessary traumatic force). The chains of memory end in sexual experience: «Von welchem Fall und von welchem Symptom immer man seinen Ausgang genommen hat, endlich gelangt man unfehlbar auf das Gebiet des sexuellen Erlebens.» [GW I:434].
Each of the three texts treats the symptom as something that can be undone: - 1894. The memory symbol lasts «bis eine Konversion in umgekehrter Richtung stattfindet» [GW I:63] (until a conversion in the reverse direction takes place). For obsessions the physician can attempt «die Rückübersetzung ins Sexuelle» [GW I:68] (the translation back into the sexual). - 1895. The symptom's fluctuation lasts «bis durch das Aufarbeiten des pathogenen Materials für dieses Symptom endgültige Erledigung geschaffen ist» [GW I:302] (until working through the pathogenic material brings final dealing-with for this symptom). - 1896. Freud reports Breuer's procedure, by which «man beseitigt nach seiner Anweisung dieses Symptom» [GW I:427] (following his instruction, one removes this symptom).
When and where. The sense first appears in 1894. In 1895 the memory-symbol label is stated outright for hysterical symptoms [GW I:302], and the symptom already stands in a structure of threads and nodal points [GW I:294]. In 1896 Freud adds the requirement that associatively awakened memories of earlier experiences co-cause the symptom [GW I:432], and the finding that the chains end in sexual experience [GW I:434]. The last appearance as a definition in the pages read is 1908: «Das hysterische Symptom ist das Erinnerungssymbol gewisser wirksamer (traumatischer) Eindrücke und Erlebnisse.» [GW VII:196]. What changes along the way is the explanatory weight. In 1894 it rests on a quantity displaced by defence; in 1895 and 1896 it rests on chains of memories. What stays is that the symptom stands in for something that can be traced and undone [ii].
Freud's own or taken over. - The name "Konversion" is Freud's proposal [GW I:63]. He makes it in a position he shares with Breuer: «Mit dieser Wendung nähern wir, Breuer und ich, uns den bekannten Definitionen der Hysterie von Oppenheim und Strümpell» [GW I:65]. - In 1895 the conversion theory is cited without an author: «wie es die Konversionstheorie der Hysterie behauptet» [GW I:302]. - In 1896 the memory-symbol thesis is attributed to Breuer [GW I:427]. - The co-causation by earlier memory is Freud's own thesis, and he hedges it: «Wenn dieser Satz — wie ich meine — ohne Ausnahme richtig ist» [GW I:432].
Abandoned or kept. The pages read show no explicit abandonment. In 1908 formulas 1 and 2 stand among nine formulas, which are declared compatible: «Sie widersprechen einander nicht, sondern entsprechen teils vollständigeren und schärferen Fassungen, teils der Anwendung verschiedener Gesichtspunkte.» [GW VII:195]. In 1917 the traumatic formula of 1893/95 is the subject of an expectation stated in the future tense. That formula concerns neurosis rather than the symptom: «der traumatische Gesichtspunkt wird nicht etwa als irrig aufzugeben sein; er wird sich anderswo einfügen und unterordnen müssen.» [GW XI:285]. The lecture then breaks off this line: «Wir brechen hier wieder den Weg ab, den wir eingeschlagen haben.» [GW XI:285]. The pages read do not carry out the subordination.
Not to be confused with. "Ersatz" in this sense substitutes for an idea [GW I:67] or for remembering: «Das hysterische Symptom ist der durch „Konversion“ erzeugte Ersatz für die assoziative Wiederkehr dieser traumatischen Erlebnisse.» [GW VII:196] (the substitute, produced by conversion, for the associative return of those traumatic experiences). It is not a substitute for a satisfaction, which is Sense 3.
In Freud's words. - «Und wirklich gipfelt die Theorie aller psychoneurotischen Symptome in dem einen Satz, daß auch sie als Wunscherfüllungen des Unbewußten aufgefaßt werden müssen.» [GW II/III:574] (And indeed the theory of all psychoneurotic symptoms culminates in the one proposition that they too must be understood as wish fulfilments of the unconscious.) - «Das hysterische Symptom entsteht als Kompromiß aus zwei gegensätzlichen Affekt- oder Triebregungen» [GW VII:196] (The hysterical symptom arises as a compromise between two opposed affective or drive impulses.) - «Das Symptom sei Anzeichen und Ersatz einer unterbliebenen Triebbefriedigung, ein Erfolg des Verdrängungsvorganges.» [GW XIV:118] (The symptom is said to be the sign and substitute of a drive satisfaction that did not take place, a result of the process of repression.)
What it means. The symptom expresses, in altered form, a repressed aim at satisfaction. In most of the passages read it also expresses the force that opposes that aim. Some passages do not name an opposing force, for example the 1905 main-text sentence on sexual activity [GW V:63] and the 1908 formulas 4 and 5 [GW VII:196]. In the list below the first two dates are the works' labels; their layering is set out under "When and where".
The re-linked symptoms fit the definition as "Ersatz einer unterbliebenen Triebbefriedigung" [GW XIV:118] only when re-stated through these double meanings (RECONNECT). The pages read show no satisfaction meaning for the remaining prohibitions and precautions, those not fused with satisfaction and not belonging to the self-punishing series. For these the tension with the definition stays (HOLD TENSION).
In the 1908 and 1917 pages the unconscious phantasy is the form through which the repressed aim reaches the symptom. Formula 4 makes the phantasy serve wish fulfilment, and in 1917 the libido reaches the repressed fixations by way of phantasies. Reading phantasy as the vehicle of Sense 3, and not as a separate sense, is an interpretation these passages license [ii].
When and where. The date of first appearance is uncertain. - Traumdeutung. The Traumdeutung pages read carry a later layer. On the same page Freud calls the 1908 essay «meine letzten Formulierungen der Entstehung hysterischer Symptome» [GW II/III:575] (my latest formulations of the origin of hysterical symptoms). The pages therefore cannot date the symptom paragraph to 1900. - Drei Abhandlungen. These pages are layered in the main text as well as in the footnote. The main text appeals to «eine seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren sich mehrende Anzahl von Psychoanalysen» [GW V:63] (a number of psychoanalyses growing over twenty-five years). A footnote on GW V:67 cites works printed with the dates 1921 and 1920. The footnote on GW V:63 presents itself as an amendment, «Es ist nur eine Vervollständigung und nicht eine Verringerung dieser Aussage» [GW V:63]. It names the ego as the second ground of symptoms: «andererseits auf dem Einspruch des Ichs, der Reaktion gegen dieselben» [GW V:63] (on the other side, on the objection of the ego, the reaction against them). - Conclusion. The earliest attestation in the pages read whose date is not undermined by visible layering is therefore 1908. This conclusion rests on the 1908 main text, where the formulas stand. It makes no claim about the dates of the 1908 footnotes.
The vocabulary is located in the pages read as follows: - «Symptombildner» appears in the Drei Abhandlungen pages [GW V:66]. Because those pages are layered, the pages read do not date the word to 1905. - «Kompromiß» is first applied to the symptom in 1908 [GW VII:196]. In the Traumdeutung pages compromise is said only of a dream, in Ferenczi's description [GW II/III:578]. - «Ersatzbefriedigungen» appears only in 1926 [GW XIV:142].
What changes is the opponent of satisfaction and the reach of the formula (see Tensions held). What stays is that a repressed aim reaches a disguised, altered expression in the symptom, in most of the passages together with the force that opposes it. The 1926 negative obsessional symptoms express chiefly the defensive and punishing side. The pages read show them carrying a satisfaction meaning only where fusion with satisfaction succeeds [GW XIV:142], or, for the self-punishing series, through their masochistic meaning [GW XIV:147] [ii].
Freud's own or taken over. The pages present the sexual formulation as one Freud had given before: «wie ich es an anderer Stelle ausgedrückt habe» [GW V:63]. They name no other source for it. This shows that the formulation is earlier, not that the sense originated with him. Freud restricts the bisexual formula 9: «Ich bemerke ausdrücklich, daß ich diesem Satze eine ähnliche Allgemeingültigkeit nicht zusprechen kann» [GW VII:197]. Sadger is reported to argue for its general validity [GW VII:198]. The word "Introversion" is taken from Jung for the intermediate stage of symptom formation, with a meaning Freud fixes himself [GW XI:389].
Abandoned or kept. Freud keeps the core in 1926: «Die Grundzüge der Symptombildung sind längst studiert und in hoffentlich unanfechtbarer Weise ausgesprochen worden.» [GW XIV:118] (The basic features of symptom formation were studied long ago and stated, it is hoped, in an unassailable way.) He leaves one particular structure open in scope. He names «jene hysterischen Symptome, die uns als Kompromiß zwischen Befriedigungs- und Strafbedürfnis durchsichtig geworden sind» [GW XIV:126] (those hysterical symptoms that have become transparent to us as a compromise between the need for satisfaction and the need for punishment). He says that such symptoms, as fulfilments of a super-ego demand, share in the ego from the outset [GW XIV:126]. Then he writes: «Ob alle primären hysterischen Symptome so gebaut sind, verdiente eine sorgfältige Untersuchung.» [GW XIV:126] (Whether all primary hysterical symptoms are built this way would deserve careful investigation.) The open question concerns this super-ego-involved compromise between satisfaction and punishment. It is not an open question about compromise between drive and repression as such.
Not to be confused with. - The Ersatz of Sense 4 [GW XI:289]. - The perceptual definition of wish fulfilment, «das Wiedererscheinen der Wahrnehmung ist die Wunscherfüllung» [GW II/III:571]. The pages do not show that the symptom fulfils a wish in this perceptual sense.
The 1926 conversion symptom that replaces a process, «Durch die Analyse kann man erfahren, welchen gestörten Erregungsablauf sie ersetzen.» [GW XIV:140] (Analysis can show which disturbed course of excitation they replace), should not be split off from this sense. In the same work the drive satisfaction that fails to occur is described as an intended course of excitation that does not come about: «der im Es beabsichtigte Erregungsablauf komme infolge der Verdrängung überhaupt nicht zustande» [GW XIV:118] (the course of excitation intended in the id does not come about at all, as a result of repression). The text thus links replacing a disturbed course of excitation with replacing an absent satisfaction [ii].
In Freud's words. - «Die neurotischen Symptome haben also ihren Sinn wie die Fehlleistungen, wie die Träume, und so wie diese ihren Zusammenhang mit dem Leben der Personen, die sie zeigen.» [GW XI:265] (Neurotic symptoms, then, have their sense, like parapraxes and like dreams, and like these they are connected with the life of the persons who show them.) - «Wir haben als den „Sinn" eines Symptoms zweierlei zusammengefaßt, sein Woher und sein Wohin oder Wozu, das heißt die Eindrücke und Erlebnisse, von denen es ausgeht, und die Absichten, denen es dient.» [GW XI:294] (Under the "sense" of a symptom we have brought together two things: its where-from and its where-to or what-for, that is, the impressions and experiences it starts from and the intentions it serves.)
What it means. «Der Sinn eines Symptoms liegt, wie wir erfahren haben, in einer Beziehung zum Erleben des Kranken.» [GW XI:278] (The sense of a symptom lies in a relation to the patient's experience.) Beyond that relation lies the intention: «Aber wir sind nicht genötigt, bei diesem Schein Halt zu machen» [GW XI:270] (But we are not obliged to stop at this appearance).
The text says the symptom itself is conscious, but it says so for obsessional symptoms: «Natürlich sind die Zwangsvorstellungen und Zwangsimpulse nicht selbst unbewußt» [GW XI:287] (Of course the obsessional ideas and impulses are not themselves unconscious). It adds: «Sie wären nicht Symptome geworden, wenn sie nicht zum Bewußtsein durchgedrungen wären.» [GW XI:287] (They would not have become symptoms if they had not broken through to consciousness.) Because both sentences have obsessional ideas and impulses as their subject, the consciousness claim is not generalised here to all symptoms.
The sense of the symptom is unknown to the patient «immer und überall» [GW XI:288] (always and everywhere). That the sense be unconscious is a condition of the symptom: «Aber es ist auch erforderlich, daß dieser Sinn unbewußt sei, damit das Symptom zustande komme.» [GW XI:289] (But it is also required that this sense be unconscious for the symptom to come about.) In this lecture "unbewußt" stands beside the phrase «dem Kranken unbekannt» [GW XI:288] (unknown to the patient). Taking the two as one condition, and reading "unbewußt" here as a descriptive use, is this entry's interpretation [ii]. The preceding page pulls the other way, because it speaks of «einen besonderen, vom übrigen abgeschlossenen Bezirk des Seelenlebens» [GW XI:287] (a particular region of mental life, closed off from the rest).
Symptom formation in this lecture is a substitute for a failed becoming-conscious: «Die Symptombildung ist ein Ersatz für etwas anderes, was unterblieben ist.» [GW XI:289] (Symptom formation is a substitute for something else that failed to take place.) The fact that symptoms can be interpreted is offered as proof of unconscious processes, with a hedge: it «ist ein unerschütterlicher Beweis für die Existenz — oder, wenn Sie so lieber wollen, für die Notwendigkeit der Annahme — unbewußter seelischer Vorgänge.» [GW XI:288] (is an unshakeable proof of the existence, or, if you prefer, of the necessity of assuming, unconscious mental processes).
When and where. In the pages read the word "Sinn" is applied to symptoms only in the 1917 lectures. Earlier texts come close without the word: the «Rückübersetzung ins Sexuelle» of 1894 [GW I:68], the 1896 plan «von den Symptomen aus zur Kenntnis der Ursachen vorzudringen» [GW I:426] (to advance from the symptoms to knowledge of the causes), and the sexual «Bedeutungen» of 1908 [GW VII:199]. Within 1917, Lecture XVII gives the sense as relation to experience [GW XI:278], and in the first case it already goes on from that relation to the intention of the obsessional action [GW XI:270]. Lecture XVIII names the pair explicitly as Woher and Wozu and presents it as already established, in the perfect tense: «Wir haben als den „Sinn" eines Symptoms zweierlei zusammengefaßt» [GW XI:294]. Earlier in the same lecture it refers back to «das, was wir den „Sinn" der Zwangshandlung genannt haben» [GW XI:286]. Lecture XVIII then grounds the symptom's dependence on the unconscious in «das Wohin, die Tendenz des Symptoms, die von Anfang an unbewußt gewesen sein kann» [GW XI:294] (the where-to, the tendency of the symptom, which may have been unconscious from the start).
Freud's own or taken over. Breuer is credited as the first to uncover the sense: «Der Sinn der neurotischen Symptome ist zuerst von J. Breuer aufgedeckt worden» [GW XI:264]. Janet is credited with an independent demonstration, «Es ist richtig, daß P. Janet unabhängig denselben Nachweis erbracht hat» [GW XI:264], and the same page grants him literary priority. Leuret is credited with the earlier opinion that even the deliria of the insane «müßten sich als sinnvoll erkennen lassen, wenn wir erst verstünden, sie zu übersetzen» [GW XI:264] (would have to be recognisable as meaningful once we understood how to translate them). Freud declares the priority question fairly indifferent: «Es mag uns übrigens ziemlich gleichgültig sein, von wem diese Entdeckung herrührt» [GW XI:264]. The further thesis is that unconscious processes contain the symptom's sense and must stay unconscious for the symptom to arise. This too is presented as Breuer's. Freud asserts it with him, «Ich will mit Breuer folgendes behaupten» [GW XI:288], and on the next page speaks of «Diese Entdeckung von Breuer» [GW XI:289].
Abandoned or kept. The texts read do not say. In the 1926 pages read, "Sinn" is not used; a symptom receives «die Bedeutung einer Befriedigung» [GW XIV:142] (the meaning of a satisfaction).
Not to be confused with. - The manifest senselessness of the symptom as the patient and observer judge it: «für eine sinnlose Idee und eine zwecklose Handlung jene vergangene Situation aufzufinden» [GW XI:278] (to find, for a senseless idea and a purposeless action, the past situation). - Ersatz in Sense 3. Here what is replaced is a becoming-conscious, not a satisfaction.
Sense 1 is stated as clinical usage in the 1894 [GW I:72], 1896 [GW I:425], 1917 [GW XI:372; GW XI:279] and 1926 [GW XIV:113] pages read. The 1895 and 1908 pages use the word in a plain way, for example «Den Lohn der Arbeit aber, das Aufhören der Krankheitssymptome» [GW I:304] and «von den aufdringlichen Symptomen zu den verborgenen unbewußten Phantasien» [GW VII:195], but they do not state the clinical-sign sense. It is not shown in the 1900 or 1905 pages read. Reading Sense 1 as the ordinary ground from which the other senses depart is this entry's interpretation [ii]. In 1926 Freud grants that in usage an inhibition can be a symptom [GW XIV:113], and he then distinguishes inhibition from symptom by locus [GW XIV:117]. Treating this as a separation of two senses of the word is this entry's reading [ii].
In 1908 Sense 2 is kept alongside Sense 3, but not on an equal footing. The formulas are declared compatible [GW VII:195], and on the next page they are ranked: «Unter diesen verschiedenen Bestimmungen ist es die siebente, welche das Wesen des hysterischen Symptoms als Realisierung einer unbewußten Phantasie am erschöpfendsten zum Ausdrucke bringt» [GW VII:196] (Among these various determinations it is the seventh that most exhaustively expresses the essence of the hysterical symptom as the realisation of an unconscious phantasy). The memory-symbol formulas 1 and 2 thus stand beneath the compromise formula 7. The essay asserts that they fit with it but does not show how. The ranking sentence understands the essence of the symptom as the realisation of an unconscious phantasy, which is the frame of the whole essay: «Die hysterischen Symptome sind nichts anderes als die durch „Konversion“ zur Darstellung gebrachten unbewußten Phantasien» [GW VII:194]. Reading the ranking as placing compromise within this phantasy frame is this entry's observation [ii]. In 1917 Freud expects, in the future tense, that the traumatic viewpoint will not have to be given up as erroneous but will have to be fitted in and subordinated elsewhere: «der traumatische Gesichtspunkt wird nicht etwa als irrig aufzugeben sein; er wird sich anderswo einfügen und unterordnen müssen.» [GW XI:285]. The pages read do not carry out that subordination [ii].
Sense 4 can be read as joining Senses 2 and 3: - Its "Woher" consists of «die Eindrücke und Erlebnisse» [GW XI:294], which belong to Sense 2. - Its "Wozu" consists of «die Absichten» [GW XI:294]. In one case the intention is a wish represented as fulfilled, which belongs to Sense 3: «sie stellt diesen Wunsch nach Art eines Traumes in einer gegenwärtigen Handlung als erfüllt dar» [GW XI:270].
That the two parts of the sense line up with the two earlier senses is a licensed reading [ii]. The text does not say that Sense 4 was meant as such a synthesis, and this remains a conjecture [iii].
Within Sense 3, the 1926 text adds a place: outside the ego organisation [GW XIV:125]. It also adds a sequel: «der Kampf gegen die Triebregung findet seine Fortsetzung in dem Kampf gegen das Symptom» [GW XIV:125] (the struggle against the drive impulse continues as the struggle against the symptom). A reader could count this as a fifth sense [ii].
The 1926 account of conversion symptoms recalls the memory symbol of Sense 2. It treats them as pieces of the situation of repression: «Der Schmerz war in der Situation, in welcher die Verdrängung vorfiel, vorhanden; die Halluzination war damals Wahrnehmung» [GW XIV:141]. It uses no memory vocabulary, however, so the link is a conjecture [iii].
Punishment is therefore not new in 1926. In the Traumdeutung example the symptom already suits the punishing side: «so war das Symptom auch dem strafenden Gedankengang recht» [GW II/III:575] (so the symptom was acceptable to the punishing train of thought as well).
On generality, the 1908 text says a hysterical symptom corresponds «notwendigerweise einem Kompromiß» [GW VII:197] (necessarily to a compromise) between a libidinal and a repressing impulse. The 1926 question whether all primary hysterical symptoms are «so gebaut» [GW XIV:126] concerns the narrower compromise between the need for satisfaction and the need for punishment. The two statements therefore do not directly oppose each other. The 1926 pages read do not say whether the 1908 "necessarily" still holds. - Negative symptoms and substitute satisfaction (RECONNECT in part, HOLD TENSION for the rest). In 1926 the core definition makes the symptom «Anzeichen und Ersatz einer unterbliebenen Triebbefriedigung» [GW XIV:118]. In the same work one kind of obsessional symptom is negative: «Es sind entweder Verbote, Vorsichtsmaßregeln, Bußen, also negativer Natur, oder im Gegenteil Ersatzbefriedigungen» [GW XIV:142], and this negative group is the older one [GW XIV:142]. Taken alone, the negative group does not fit the definition as substitute for satisfaction. The text re-links part of it, in two ways, each with its own scope: - Fusion, stated as a success that may not come about. «Es ist ein Triumph der Symptombildung, wenn es gelingt, das Verbot mit der Befriedigung zu verquicken» [GW XIV:142]. - Masochistic meaning, for one series. In obsessional neuroses in which the ego spares itself the perception of guilt, it does so «durch eine neue Reihe von Symptomen, Bußhandlungen, Einschränkungen zur Selbstbestrafung» [GW XIV:147], and «Diese Symptome bedeuten aber gleichzeitig Befriedigungen masochistischer Triebregungen» [GW XIV:147]. This is said of that series, not of the older negative group of GW XIV:142 as a whole.
For these symptoms the definition holds once re-stated through the double meaning (RECONNECT) [ii]. For prohibitions and precautions that are not fused with satisfaction and do not belong to the self-punishing series, the pages read show no satisfaction meaning. Between them and the definition at GW XIV:118 the tension stays (HOLD TENSION). - Real or irreal satisfaction (HOLD TENSION). In 1917 the libido manages «zu einer allerdings außerordentlich eingeschränkten und kaum mehr kenntlichen realen Befriedigung durchzudringen.» [GW XI:375] (to break through to a real satisfaction, though extremely restricted and hardly recognisable). The same lecture speaks of «Der irreale Charakter der neurotischen Befriedigung» [GW XI:389] (the irreal character of neurotic satisfaction). - Universal sense and typical symptoms (HOLD TENSION). Freud writes «Daß es immer und in allen Fällen so ist, kann ich ja nur behaupten, nicht beweisen.» [GW XI:265] (That it is so always and in every case I can only assert, not prove). He then concedes that the method fails for typical symptoms: «daß uns aber unsere Kunst für die weit häufigeren typischen Symptome derselben im Stiche läßt» [GW XI:279] (but our art fails us for the far more frequent typical symptoms). The gap is bridged only by a supposition [GW XI:280]. - Outside or inside the ego (HOLD TENSION). In 1926 the symptom exists outside the ego organisation [GW XIV:125]. Yet «Als Erfüllungen einer Forderung des Über-Ichs haben solche Symptome von vornherein Anteil am Ich» [GW XIV:126] (as fulfilments of a demand of the super-ego, such symptoms share in the ego from the outset). Freud presents these symptoms as an instance of the ego's effort to bind the symptom: «Wir wissen, daß ein solches Bestreben bereits den Akt der Symptombildung beeinflußt.» [GW XIV:126]. He names their double position himself: «sie sind sozusagen Grenzstationen mit gemischter Besetzung» [GW XIV:126] (they are, so to speak, frontier stations with mixed garrison). In a later chapter he conjectures that in hysteria the ego restricts itself to repression, and he qualifies this at once because of these same symptoms: «So ganz ausschließend richtig kann das zwar nicht sein» [GW XIV:145], since «das hysterische Symptom gleichzeitig die Erfüllung einer Strafanforderung des Über-Ichs bedeutet» [GW XIV:145]. Freud thus names the tension himself. Reading his image as holding both sides together without dissolving them is this entry's interpretation [ii]. - Becoming conscious and being told (RECONNECT). In 1917 the symptom must disappear once its unconscious processes become conscious [GW XI:289]. Knowledge merely communicated by the physician does not remove it. Freud nonetheless insists: «Aber unser Satz, daß die Symptome mit dem Wissen um ihren Sinn vergehen, bleibt darum doch richtig.» [GW XI:291] (But our proposition that symptoms pass away with knowledge of their sense remains correct all the same.) The proposition holds only when it is re-linked to Freud's distinction between kinds of knowledge. - Scope (HOLD TENSION). In 1917 the general wording about «neurotischen Symptomen» [GW XI:373] stands against the restriction «daß alles hier Gesagte und im weiteren Folgende sich nur auf die Symptombildung bei der hysterischen Neurose bezieht.» [GW XI:375] (that everything said here and below concerns only symptom formation in hysteria). When the lecture repeats the restriction, it adds that the basic principle is kept for obsessional neurosis: «Alles hier Gesagte bezieht sich nur auf die Symptombildung bei der Hysterie. Schon bei der Zwangsneurose ist — bei Erhaltung des Grundsätzlichen — vieles anders zu finden.» [GW XI:390] (Everything said here concerns only symptom formation in hysteria. Already in obsessional neurosis, while the basic principle is preserved, much is found to be different.) The tension is therefore narrower than a flat opposition. The detailed account is restricted to hysteria, while its basic principle is said to reach at least obsessional neurosis. In 1926 Freud writes that for obsessional neurosis and paranoia «sind wir noch nicht vorbereitet» [GW XIV:128] (we are not yet prepared). This reservation is local to chapter III. In chapter V of the same work he turns to obsessional neurosis «in der Erwartung, hier mehr über die Symptombildung zu erfahren» [GW XIV:141] (in the expectation of learning more about symptom formation here) and treats its symptom formation at length [GW XIV:141-147]. - Anxiety and symptom (HOLD TENSION). In the case of Little Hans, the readily offered answer is «Die unverständliche Angst vor dem Pferd ist das Symptom» [GW XIV:129] (The incomprehensible fear of the horse is the symptom). A later chapter warns «die Beziehungen zwischen Angst und Symptombildung nicht allzu fest zu knüpfen» [GW XIV:140] (not to tie the relations between anxiety and symptom formation too firmly).
| German quote | Anchor | Our English rendering | What it establishes |
|---|---|---|---|
| «für deren Grundsymptome ein psychischer Mechanismus gar nicht anzunehmen ist.» | GW I:72 | for whose basic symptoms no psychical mechanism at all is to be assumed | Sense 1 in 1894; the word does not imply defence |
| «Das Ich hat damit erreicht, daß es widerspruchsfrei geworden ist, es hat sich aber dafür mit einem Erinnerungssymbol belastet» | GW I:63 | The ego has become free of contradiction but has burdened itself with a memory symbol | Sense 2: defence and its price |
| «daß die Zwangsvorstellung einen Ersatz oder ein Surrogat der unverträglichen sexuellen Vorstellung darstellt und sie im Bewußtsein abgelöst hat.» | GW I:67 | that the obsessional idea is a substitute or surrogate for the incompatible sexual idea and has replaced it in consciousness | Ersatz for an idea (1894) |
| «Es führt aber in der Wirklichkeit eine ununterbrochene Reihe von den unveränderten Erinnerungsresten affektvoller Erlebnisse und Denkakte bis zu den hysterischen Symptomen, ihren Erinnerungssymbolen.» | GW I:302 | An unbroken series runs from memory residues to the hysterical symptoms, their memory symbols | Sense 2 stated outright (1895) |
| «daß kein hysterisches Symptom aus einem realen Erlebnis allein hervorgehen kann, sondern daß alle Male die assoziativ geweckte Erinnerung an frühere Erlebnisse zur Verursachung des Symptoms mitwirkt» | GW I:432 | No hysterical symptom arises from a real experience alone; awakened memory always co-causes it | Freud's own thesis within Sense 2 (1896) |
| «Und wirklich gipfelt die Theorie aller psychoneurotischen Symptome in dem einen Satz, daß auch sie als Wunscherfüllungen des Unbewußten aufgefaßt werden müssen.» | GW II/III:574 | The theory of all psychoneurotic symptoms culminates in their being wish fulfilments of the unconscious | Sense 3 as wish fulfilment; page shows later layers |
| «Korrekter gesagt: Ein Anteil des Symptoms entspricht der unbewußten Wunscherfüllung, ein anderer der Reaktionsbildung gegen dieselbe.» | GW II/III:574 | More correctly: one part of the symptom corresponds to unconscious wish fulfilment, another to reaction formation against it | Footnote correction; tension with main text |
| «Die Symptome sind, wie ich es an anderer Stelle ausgedrückt habe, die Sexualbetätigung der Kranken.» | GW V:63 | The symptoms are the sexual activity of the patients | Sense 3, sexual version; Freud's own earlier formulation; pages layered |
| «Das hysterische Symptom entsteht als Kompromiß aus zwei gegensätzlichen Affekt- oder Triebregungen» | GW VII:196 | The hysterical symptom arises as a compromise between two opposed impulses | First application of "Kompromiß" to the symptom in the pages read (1908) |
| «Sie widersprechen einander nicht, sondern entsprechen teils vollständigeren und schärferen Fassungen, teils der Anwendung verschiedener Gesichtspunkte.» | GW VII:195 | They do not contradict each other but are fuller versions or applications of different points of view | Formulas of Senses 2 and 3 declared compatible; ranked under formula 7 at GW VII:196 |
| «Die neurotischen Symptome haben also ihren Sinn wie die Fehlleistungen, wie die Träume, und so wie diese ihren Zusammenhang mit dem Leben der Personen, die sie zeigen.» | GW XI:265 | Neurotic symptoms have their sense, like parapraxes and dreams | Sense 4 (1917) |
| «Wir haben als den „Sinn" eines Symptoms zweierlei zusammengefaßt, sein Woher und sein Wohin oder Wozu, das heißt die Eindrücke und Erlebnisse, von denen es ausgeht, und die Absichten, denen es dient.» | GW XI:294 | The sense combines where-from and what-for | Two-part definition of sense |
| «Die Symptombildung ist ein Ersatz für etwas anderes, was unterblieben ist.» | GW XI:289 | Symptom formation is a substitute for something that failed to take place | Ersatz for a failed becoming-conscious |
| «Die beiden Kräfte, die sich entzweit haben, treffen im Symptom wieder zusammen, versöhnen sich gleichsam durch das Kompromiß der Symptombildung.» | GW XI:373 | The two forces meet again in the symptom, reconciled through compromise | Sense 3 in 1917 |
| «Sie schaffen also Ersatz für die versagte Befriedigung durch eine Regression der Libido auf frühere Zeiten» | GW XI:379 | They create a substitute for denied satisfaction by regression of the libido | Ersatz for satisfaction |
| «Symptom hingegen heißt soviel wie Anzeichen eines krankhaften Vorganges.» | GW XIV:113 | A symptom means a sign of a morbid process | Sense 1 made explicit (1926) |
| «Das Symptom kann nicht mehr als ein Vorgang im oder am Ich beschrieben werden.» | GW XIV:117 | The symptom can no longer be described as a process in or at the ego | Symptom set against inhibition by locus |
| «Das Symptom sei Anzeichen und Ersatz einer unterbliebenen Triebbefriedigung, ein Erfolg des Verdrängungsvorganges.» | GW XIV:118 | The symptom is sign and substitute of an absent drive satisfaction, a result of repression | Sense 3 kept in 1926 |
| «Ob alle primären hysterischen Symptome so gebaut sind, verdiente eine sorgfältige Untersuchung.» | GW XIV:126 | Whether all primary hysterical symptoms are so built would deserve careful study | Open whether all primary hysterical symptoms have the satisfaction-punishment, super-ego-involved structure |
| «Es sind entweder Verbote, Vorsichtsmaßregeln, Bußen, also negativer Natur, oder im Gegenteil Ersatzbefriedigungen, sehr häufig in symbolischer Verkleidung.» | GW XIV:142 | Either prohibitions, precautions, penances, or substitute satisfactions in symbolic disguise | Two kinds of obsessional symptom, one negative (1926); only occurrence of "Ersatzbefriedigungen" in the pages read |
None of these passages states compromise as a definition of all symptoms without restriction. How far the 1917 account reaches beyond hysteria is held under Tensions held (Scope). - It does not date the wish-fulfilment paragraph of the Traumdeutung, or the Drei Abhandlungen pages (main text or footnote), to their works' first-publication years. - It does not claim that "Sinn" disappears after 1917. The 1926 pages read simply do not use it. - It makes no claim about how anxiety and the symptom relate beyond the 1926 pages read, which defer that problem [GW XIV:128]. - It does not use the case histories, the Abriß, or any outside account. - Calling the 1894 hysterical structure a "compromise" would be a reader's restatement, since the word does not occur in the 1894 text.
| Source | Text | Pages read | Notes on pages |
|---|---|---|---|
| S01 | Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen, signed «Ende Jänner 1894» | GW I:57-74 | Text on 59-74; 57-58 carry a title and a blank. Internally the essay cites a «Vorläufige Mitteilung, 1895» [GW I:74], which is an unresolved date anomaly. |
| S02 | Studien über Hysterie, Zur Psychotherapie der Hysterie (part), 1895 | GW I:294-306 | 296, 297 and 300 were not drawn on. |
| S03 | Zur Ätiologie der Hysterie (opening), 1896 | GW I:425-436 | Breaks off mid-sentence at 436. |
| S04 | Die Traumdeutung VII.C (part), 1900 | GW II/III:568-578 | Contains later layers. |
| S05 | Drei Abhandlungen I.4 (part), 1905 | GW V:63-67 | Begins mid-sentence; layered; OCR damage at the key sentence on 63. |
| S06 | Hysterische Phantasien und ihre Beziehung zur Bisexualität, 1908 | GW VII:191-199 | The year comes from the source label, not the pages. |
| S07 | Vorlesung XVII, 1917 | GW XI:264-281 | |
| S08 | Vorlesung XVIII, 1917 | GW XI:282-295 | |
| S09 | Vorlesung XXIII, 1917 | GW XI:372-391 | 376 and 387 are not among the pages used. |
| S10 | Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, ch. I-III, 1926 | GW XIV:113-129 | The original page 120 is missing; the supply duplicates 118. |
| S11 | Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, ch. V-VI (part), 1926 | GW XIV:140-147 |
The case histories (Dora, the Rat Man, the Wolf Man) and the Abriß (1940) were not read for this concept. No single page with eight or more hits falls outside the clusters read.
The pages read also carry the following, which this edition does not yet integrate:
First edition, November 2026. Built from the German text of Freud's Gesammelte Werke only, read source by source; every German quotation was checked against the page it cites. References give volume and page, for example [GW X:291]. English renderings are our own. A mark [ii] means our interpretation of the passages, [iii] a synthesis across texts; unmarked sentences report what the pages say. Each long entry says which texts were read and which were not. Entries are revised as the reading continues; corrections are welcome at contact@llulllab.com.